

Basic Issues Underlying the Present Crisis

Address by Secretary Rusk¹

The foreign policy of a democracy must rest on the support of informed citizens. On Armistice Eve, 1918, men like Paul Kellogg and Learned Hand, Harry Emerson Fosdick and Charles Beard brought into being an organization to help interested citizens to become more fully and intelligently informed about our relations with the rest of the world.

Now this is important not just because when a great democracy moves in foreign policy it must have the understanding and support of its citizens; it is also because foreign policy in fact, regardless of the abstractions of international law, reaches into every home in the community and in the country. If every county courthouse, for example, could display a map of the world showing where the county's men and women have served since 1941 throughout the world in defense of freedom and in defense of the security of this country, we would have a dramatic illustration of the fact that foreign policy is in fact the people's business.

The Foreign Policy Association has for almost half a century made a major contribution to public understanding of significant international problems facing this country.

For about half your history this great country of ours was under an illusion of irresponsibility. We were born; we grew; we were developed; we became prosperous through more than a century of the most intimate relations with nations beyond the oceans, beyond our own frontiers. Somehow, after World War I, we tried to put that aside. We tried to assume that we had no great burdens to bear, and we did not bring into the international field the full strength and re-

sources and capacity to influence the course of events which rested here in the United States.

History has no chance to write about what might have been. But I think that we, as Americans, need to consider in quiet moments what the story might have been to prevent the tragedy of World War II and to stabilize international institutions, had we, during the first half of your own history as an organization, realized the responsibilities that go with the capacity to act.

During the second half of your history, we have had thrust upon us by the course of events a responsibility which we have never really known before as a people, imposing upon us great burdens, imposing upon us incredibly difficult and complex decisions, but also imposing upon us an awareness that this country cannot be safe if others are insecure, that this country cannot be prosperous if others are ridden by poverty.

The Cuban Crisis

We meet today in an atmosphere of crisis, and I wish that I could report to you that that crisis has been resolved. I cannot, because much remains to be done. I suppose that many of you would like for me to say something about the present crisis. In fact, our policy and our course of conduct are already a matter of full public record. You will have a full understanding of the situation if you remind yourselves of the President's statements of September 4² and 13³ about Cuba, the President's forthright address to the Nation on October 22,⁴ Ambassador Stevenson's classic speech before the Security Council at the

¹ Bulletin of Sept. 24, 1962, p. 479.

² *Ibid.*, Oct. 1, 1962, p. 481.

³ *Ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1962, p. 735.

⁴ Made before the Foreign Policy Association at New York, N. Y., on Nov. 20 (press release 691 dated Nov. 21).

United Nations the following day,* and the public exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev on October 27 and October 28.²

There have been private talks among governments and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and details of these talks have not been made fully public; but they are aimed at the accomplishment of publicly declared policy, of purposes we all understand, of results consistent with the security and well-being of the Western Hemisphere and of the peace of the world.

In his press conference today at 5 o'clock the President will, of course, comment on the Cuban situation³ as we now see it. But no citizen need suppose himself uninformed about his country's attitude on the issues to be resolved before we can write an end to what is called the Cuban crisis.

As a matter of fact, consultations in progress as we meet here now may very much affect the situation at today's end. So there are moments when the Secretary of State must try to make sense instead of making news—unless indeed that be news. (Laughter.)

May I say to my friends of the press that a text of what I have to say will be made available later in the day when my colleagues have a chance to discover what I am going to say, because the situation is so fluid that I have made some considerable revisions in what I thought I might say a few days ago. And, as for the photographs, I asked some photographers once why they kept taking pictures when they must have thousands already. And one of them said, "Well, because, Mr. Secretary, if you get shot, we want the last one." But as far as the text is concerned, I think it is worthwhile once in a while to remind the publishers and editors that world's reporters are more valuable and have more to do than simply to snip excerpts from previously produced texts.

A Decision the Communists Must Make

Today I should like to speak briefly and simply about some basic issues which underlie the present crisis. The events of the past 2 months in Cuba and elsewhere have caused many capitals to look long and hard at the prospects for peace and the dangers of war.

* *Ibid.*, p. 729.

² *Ibid.*, p. 741.

³ See p. 874.

I suspect that we are on the front edge of significant, perhaps unpredictable events, a period in which some of the customary patterns of thought will have to be reviewed and perhaps revised, a process that will affect governments in all parts of the world. It seems to me, therefore, that it would be appropriate for me to remind you of certain far-reaching decisions which the governments of the world must face in this present period, decisions which critically affect the prospects for peace and the survival of freedom.

The first of these far-reaching decisions is one which is to be made by the leaders of the Communist world. And I might remind you of a portion of President Kennedy's address to the United Nations in September of 1961,⁴ in which he called for a truce to terror. He said:

This will require new strength and new roles for the United Nations. For a government without checks is but a shadow, and a community without law is but a shell. Already the United Nations has become both the measure and the vehicle of man's most generous impulses. Already it has provided—in the Middle East, in Asia, in Africa this year in the Congo—a means of holding violence within bounds.

But the great question which confronted this body in 1945 is still before us: whether man's cherished hopes for progress and peace are to be destroyed by terror and disruption, whether the "fiend winds of war" can be tamed in time to free the cowering walls of reason, and whether the pledges of our charter are to be fulfilled or defeated by a conspiracy against human rights and world law.

In this, all there are not three forces, but two. One is composed of those who are trying to build the kind of world described in articles 1 and 2 of the charter. The other is a force for a different world, would render the first organization ineffectual.

The reality of the great concern expressed by President Kennedy, however, began to manifest itself before the end of World War II, that the trends of Soviet policy were causing him deepest concern and anguish for the prospects of the United Nations and for the attainment of a United Nations Charter.

I am reminded that in 1947 and 1948 Secretary of State Marshall and President Truman began the Soviet Union and other members of the Communist bloc to demand in what came to be known as the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of war-devastated Europe and that that invitation was rejected and that soon thereafter Secretary Marshall was in Moscow and urgently studying the

⁴ *Annals of the United Nations*, 1961.

...and finally and truly to join the United Nations. Because in 1945, '46, '47, the great tragedy of our day is that we had such a "near miss" in the organization of world affairs. This came in the aftermath of World War II with unparalleled power in conventional forces, a monopoly on the atomic weapon yet we committed ourselves fully to the attempt to make the United Nations a living reality.

One can describe those days either in terms of the "great commitment" or, in retrospect, as "the great mistake." But we laid down our arms. We sought to place the atomic bomb under the United Nations. We committed ourselves fully and wholeheartedly to the purposes of that charter.

In 1946 we had no ally looking toward the future—only those allies which had been formed for the purposes of defeating Nazi Germany and militarist Japan, alliances which were expected to wither away. Our military budget dropped below \$10 billion in 1947 and 1948. This was a signal: the determination of the American people to commit themselves to the purposes outlined in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the charter, in demonstration of their hope that this kind of world could in fact be brought into being.

One nation at that time stood in the way. I myself am convinced that, had it not been for that great abstention, the United Nations could have succeeded in handling efficiently and effectively the great issues which are brought before it that do not specifically involve that particular country.

The great decision that has to be made on the other side is whether in fact, as I have said on other occasions, they will pick up the great revolutionary responsibility that is waiting for them—the revolution of peace which can be brought about by a simple decision to live at peace with the rest of the world. For no other decision in the hands of a relatively few men can so transform the face of the earth as a simple decision to work to make the world for their children a living reality and not a frustrated hope.

We believe that in this period there are those on the other side who have had some sober reflections, perhaps are making some reappraisal, although there are others who obviously are not.

The harsh attack on India² is a major problem for the entire free world, as well as for India, and those who are pressing this attack must not be per-

mitted to believe that such conduct is consistent with the possibility of peace in the modern world. But surely, having looked at the dangers in our present situation, we can express the hope that leaders in countries who for ideological or other reasons are not a part of the so-called free world, who have difference about what the future is going to hold, who have differences of commitment or predilection—surely we can express the hope that these leaders recognize the utter necessity of finding a path toward peaceful existence within the framework of the United Nations. Their own national interests, the needs—indeed, demands—of their own peoples give them the same great unfinished tasks in their societies which the rest of us have. Commitment to those purposes could open up great opportunities in the days ahead.

Dangers of a Spiraling Arms Race

A second fateful decision for peace, I think, has to do with disarmament. There are many things which can and will, in due course, be said about the Cuban crisis. One of them is that Cuba has provided a dramatic example of the deadly dangers of a spiraling arms race. It is not easy to see how far-reaching disarmament can occur except as major political issues be resolved and as nations accustom themselves to living at peace with one another.

Nevertheless, it is also obvious, as we have seen in recent weeks, that modern weapons systems are themselves a source of high tension and that we must make an urgent and earnest effort to bring the arms race under control and to try to turn it downward if we possibly can.

In their exchange of messages, both Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy expressed the hope that a settlement of the Cuban crisis would be followed by other agreed measures to lessen the danger of thermonuclear war. In his letter President Kennedy said:

Mr. Chairman, both of our countries have great unfinished tasks and I know that your people as well as those of the United States can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war. Modern science and technology have given us the possibility of making labor fruitful beyond anything that could have been dreamed of a few decades ago.

I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament, as it relates to the whole world and also to critical areas. Perhaps now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real prog-

² See p. 874.

ness in this vital field. I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date. The United States government will be prepared to discuss these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or elsewhere.

That is the spirit with which we shall return next week to the 18-nation disarmament conference at Geneva. We earnestly hope that the Soviet negotiators will reflect a similar attitude. We also earnestly hope that they and all the other delegations will have taken to heart some important lessons underlined by the Cuban crisis and that all delegations, all countries, in all regions, will look upon disarmament as a high priority and urgent necessity.

This is not a matter that affects just the Soviet Union and the United States. There are other differences, other arms races. I would hope that some day we could call a conference on disarmament in which it would be out of order for any delegate to say anything more than what his own country was willing to contribute to the solution of disarmament problems—that it would be out of order for him to say what somebody else should contribute to these problems.

Perhaps I shouldn't say this, but I think it is of some importance that, at a time when the United Nations is voting unanimously for disarmament,¹⁹ 70 members are asking the United States for military assistance. This is not a problem in which two great powers have a monopoly. There are tasks to be taken up in every part of the world, although the greater danger is of course among the great powers themselves.

One of the plainest of the lessons we have learned in these recent weeks all over again—if we ever needed to learn it again—is that verbal assurances, however formal, cannot be taken at face value. Let us remember that we have just experienced an elaborate deception to cover the secret effort to develop in Cuba a serious nuclear threat to the United States and the Western Hemisphere. With this experience freshly in mind, surely no reasonable person would expect that

arms control or related agreements can be effective without appropriate and adequate verification that commitments are in fact being met.

Secrecy and Disarmament Are Incompatible

For 10 years Soviet objections to inspection have stood as a barrier to concrete progress toward disarmament. Soviet representatives like to call inspection "espionage." I would not try to say whether this is a deep-seated, traditional passion for secrecy on the Russian scene or a consequence of the belief that secrecy is an important military asset. It is probably a combination of these and many other factors.

But whatever the reasons behind this alleged preoccupation with espionage, three things seem to me to be clear.

One is that the major powers know all that they need to know about each other to inflict devastating damage in the event of war. Espionage in its classical sense is no longer relevant to this great overriding issue.

Second, arrangements can be made for international inspection, particularly in the field of nuclear testing, which does not involve the gathering of information on any matter not central to the purpose of the inspection itself. You know, we have such short memories, we need, for example—all of us—to study over again the review of the post-World War II period which Adlai Stevenson made before the Security Council on October 23d.

I suspect that many of you have already forgotten that in March of this year, after the Soviet Union had exploded almost 50 nuclear tests and *before* we had resumed nuclear testing ourselves, the British and we offered the Soviet Union a comprehensive nuclear test ban²⁰ which would involve having a look at less than one part in two thousand of Soviet territory in any given year. (This inspection would of course be reinforced by instrumentation and other means of knowing what in fact was happening.) One part in two thousand! A farthing's worth of inspection insofar as general military information is concerned. Could that possibly be espionage?

¹⁹ For a statement by Secretary Rusk made before the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee on March 21, 1962, see *BULLETIN* of April 10, 1962, p. 671.

²⁰ See p. 830.

Third, we must face the elementary fact that secrecy and disarmament are basically incompatible, for we cannot lay down our arms in the face of ignorance about what is happening in those various areas of the human landscape. Until the Soviet Union recognizes and accepts the elementary necessity of reliable safeguards, it is, quite frankly, difficult to see how urgently needed progress on disarmament can go forward.

Such agreements, under present conditions, cannot rest on naked trust. But it should not be necessary for anyone to worry about whether one side trusts the other, for the assurances of faithful performance must be built into the system through arrangements for independent verification.

We need the elementary institutional structure providing safeguards on which confidence can, in due course, be built. Otherwise we shall not have the possibility, either on our side or the other side of the Iron Curtain, of handling responsibly, honestly, and effectively the human tendency to suspect and to fear in the presence of ignorance about the other side.

In the Cuban crisis Chairman Khrushchev said that he was prepared to agree that representatives of the United Nations should verify the dismantling of the Soviet Union's offensive weapons in Cuba. But in the course of the brass tacks of negotiation, it has become evident that at least Mr. Castro's interpretation of such verification falls far short thus far of what others could in prudence accept as an adequate verification of a disarmament agreement.

In the disarmament negotiations at Geneva the Soviets have paid a certain attention, perhaps lip-service, to the need for international controls. But they have insisted that effective inspection should be installed only after there has been general and complete disarmament. During the process of disarmament, the Soviet plan would permit inspection at places where troops are being disbanded and where armaments are being destroyed. But it would not permit inspection of forces and armaments retained.

It seems obvious, indeed elementary, to us that such a plan cannot be regarded as a practical approach to disarmament. We hope that the Soviets will return to Geneva next week with a more realistic attitude toward this problem of assurance and of safeguards.

Need for Progress on Road to Disarmament

The United States believes, nevertheless, that major steps can be taken within the 3 year period referred to as phase one. We have proposed a 20-percent cut in all major armaments. We would limit the production of armaments retained to replacement on a one-for-one basis. We have proposed other significant measures, including a halt to production of fissionable material for use in weapons and a reduction of the armed forces of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to some 2,100,000 men each. These seem to us to be feasible measures. They are measures which can be undertaken, pending the beginnings of the transformation of international political life which opens the way for further measures to be adopted.

It's important to get started, to do something tangible and specific in this field and not wait until it is possible for everything to be done at once. Otherwise, we shall never get to that point and the arms race will continue. But if some of these measures could be adopted and carried out, they might indeed start a momentous revolution in international arrangements.

A final stage of general and complete disarmament is not in sight for the near future, since it would require a major transformation of international relations as an accompanying necessity. The institutions of law must be consolidated. The conduct of nations must be regularized. The possibilities of peace must be assured.

Meanwhile, however, we shall earnestly strive for measures to halt the arms race and to make progress along the road to disarmament. We most earnestly seek measures to reduce the danger of a great war. These measures might be of two kinds: preventing the future diffusion and development of nuclear weapons, and reducing the danger of war by accident or miscalculation.

In the first category are measures to prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons to individual states and to establish nuclear-free zones, for example, in Latin America or Africa, if the states in those areas so desire. Also in this category are measures to keep outer space free of nuclear weapons in orbit and to stop nuclear testing.

When the Geneva conference recessed on September 8, negotiations on a nuclear test ban had reached an apparent deadlock. Talks among the United States, the U.K., and the U.S.S.R. have

continued in the nuclear test ban subcommittee of the 18-nation conference. So far these have only confirmed that the U.S.S.R. continues to resist any type of obligatory international on-site inspection. We ourselves would like to see a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, that is, a ban on tests in all environments; but we cannot accept this unless we are certain that all parties live up to the agreement. In the case of earth tremors, such assurance requires a few on-site inspections to identify their cause.

If the other side has instruments which can do this job through instrumentation, we would press them to come forward with them. We cannot say with complete assurance that no such instruments exist. But we don't have them. If the other side does, we would like to see them. We have urged them at least 20 times to come forward with a demonstration of the capacity to detect nuclear testing, because this is a question of fact, not necessarily of policy. It's a question of what can be done to be reasonably sure that agreements are being carried out. But thus far we have not had any response on that point.

As an alternative to a comprehensive test ban, we are ready to agree today to a ban on tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space, for such tests can be detected by existing means. The Soviet Union says that it will agree to this only if we accept an unpoliced moratorium on underground tests while an inspection system for such tests is worked out. We did accept an unpoliced moratorium once, and there were secret preparations for a long series of tests by the other side. We do not need elaborate inspection, intrusive inspection, but only inspection to give us assurance that the events we are concerned about are not in fact occurring. If the other side cannot accept that much inspection, the prospects for disarmament remain, I'm afraid, somewhat dim.

The second kind of measures are those to reduce the danger of war by accident or miscalculation. One such measure would be an advance notice of major military movements and maneuvers outside of national territories. The United States has presented such a proposal at Geneva. We have also proposed the establishment of observation posts at key points to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.

The importance of these measures has been underlined by the events of the last few weeks in

Cuba. Had these proposals been in effect, the chances are that the deployment to Cuba of offensive weapons would not have taken place. This experience underlined also the importance in times of crisis of extremely rapid and reliable communications between governments. Rapid communication was instrumental in this case in averting a possible war. But even more rapid communication would in fact be desirable. The United States proposed this early in the disarmament talks in Geneva. There has been some expression of interest in it on the other side, and we would hope that this measure is now ripe for agreement.

Even small and limited measures of agreement can serve to make a great war a little less likely. At the resumed sessions of the disarmament conference the United States will press for agreement on every measure which holds the prospects of reducing danger while we work on the more ambitious task of developing a treaty for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful and law-abiding world.

Responsibility of the American People

A third fateful decision for peace is one which rests with us here in this country—rests upon the American people—that is, whether we ourselves can fully comprehend the stakes which are at issue in this particular period of our history and can accept the burdens that go with the defense of our security and the long-range survival of freedom.

Since World War II we have indeed been called upon to bear large burdens. Speaking as an American among Americans, I think we can be proud of the fact that we have responded so well to these demands. But it is easy to become bored, or tired, or a bit frustrated or resentful if these burdens continue. But they must continue. They are not burdens that we can afford to tear ourselves to pieces about each year as though we were deciding each year all over again whether we want our nation to survive.

I mentioned the fact that in 1947 and 1948 our defense budget came down to just below \$10 billion. Today it's more than \$50 billion. If we look upon that earlier defense budget as the normal annual cost of the postwar defense establishment of a nation trying to make the United Nations work, we find that the accumulated increment in our defense expenditures since 1947 over that level has amounted to more than \$425 billion. The growth

of American defense expenditures corresponds with the tragic story of one aggression after another, spelled out in the debates and in the agenda of the United Nations—billions of additional expenditure because of someone else's refusal to join the United Nations *in fact*.

It is true that the American people have spent between ninety and a hundred billion dollars in the same period for what is called foreign aid. This is not an effort on which we can relax, because the failure to spend this lesser amount will multiply the necessity for spending larger amounts on the defense side.

This nation is deeply committed to a world of independent states freely cooperating, within the framework of the United Nations Charter and in their common interests, to get on with the recognized common tasks of mankind.

In 1946, no allies; in 1962, more than 40. Why? Because we have a commitment to the independence of states. What is our interest in the so-called unaligned countries? Their independence. If the 110 members of the United Nations were genuinely secure and genuinely independent (and these newly independent countries have shown a tough zeal for their independence), there would be no great tension between Washington and Moscow. The strictly bilateral issues between us are of relative unimportance. The independence of these nations is the issue; the structure of our world society is the issue—whether it is to be that spelled out in the charter or that imposed by a doctrine of world revolution.

We are, perhaps, as I said earlier, on the leading edges of some very important events. I think the free world can look forward to these with confidence. There is a great vitality of recovery and progress in the Atlantic community. There is a solidarity of commitment in purpose in the great alliances, such as the OAS [Organization of American States] and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. There is a keen interest in their national existence, survival, and prosperity among the newly independent countries. There is a commitment on the part of the overwhelming majority of nations to the kind of world which we find congenial.

If we want to find a succinct statement of the long-range foreign policy of the American people, we can do worse than to read the opening sections of the United Nations Charter. It is no accident

that this should be so, because we helped draft the charter, in a very important sense, at a time when this country was chastened by the fires of a great war. We were thinking deeply about ourselves and our future in those days, as we must today.

But those commitments are not only congenial with American tradition; they are congenial with the great humane tradition of man. These things we share with other people, regardless of race, geographical location, or indeed—when we talk about ordinary men and women—regardless of political system. These great commitments that are so deeply rooted in the nature of man himself make allies of us all as we move into the future.

But if we shirk our responsibilities at this point, if we fail to carry these burdens through the period ahead, this could make a difference—a disastrous difference—and could shift the nature of our burdens into ever more dangerous channels.

I will say to you quite frankly we are not looking for a blank check in such matters as foreign aid. We have an obligation in Government—and those in other countries receiving American assistance, have an obligation—to see that these funds are in fact well used. There have been, and there will be, mistakes. But we should not let the mistakes disrupt the entire effort.

Our friends abroad must recognize that these funds come out of taxes, not out of some mountain of gold hidden away in a Western desert, and that in good conscience we cannot mobilize these funds from the ordinary people of the United States in order to match waste with waste. We must match performance with performance.

The external resources of the Alliance for Progress will amount to something in the order of 2 percent of the gross national product of the Latin American countries. If by what we do with the 2 percent we can stimulate and invigorate what's done with the 98 percent, much can be accomplished. To the extent that we can assist other governments in mobilizing the interests and the loyalties of their own people in this great effort, we need not be concerned about whether development will in fact occur; it will occur.

So we have some great tasks in front of us. As free people, we can look forward to them with confidence. They won't be easy to carry. But we lay them down in the most literal sense at our very peril.